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ABSTRACT
We study intraday market intermediation in an electronic market before and during
a period of large and temporary selling pressure. On May 6, 2010, U.S. financial
markets experienced a systemic intraday event – the Flash Crash – where a large
automated selling program was rapidly executed in the E-mini S&P 500 stock index
futures market. Using audit trail transaction-level data for the E-mini on May 6
and the previous three days, we find that the trading pattern of the most active
nondesignated intraday intermediaries (classified as High Frequency Traders) did
not change when prices fell during the Flash Crash.
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On May 6, 2010, U.S. financial markets experienced a systemic intraday event known as
the “Flash Crash.” The CFTC-SEC (2010b) joint report describes the Flash Crash as
follows:
“At 2:32 [CT] p.m., against [a] backdrop of unusually high volatility and thinning
liquidity, a large fundamental trader (a mutual fund complex) initiated a sell program to
sell a total of 75,000 E-mini [S&P 500 futures] contracts (valued at approximately $4.1
billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position. [. . . ] This large fundamental trader chose
to execute this sell program via an automated execution algorithm (“Sell Algorithm”) that
was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-mini market to target an execution
rate set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over the previous minute, but without
regard to price or time. The execution of this sell program resulted in the largest net
change in daily position of any trader in the E-mini since the beginning of the year (from
January 1, 2010 through May 6, 2010). [. . . ] This sell pressure was initially absorbed
by: high frequency traders (“HFTs”) and other intermediaries in the futures market;
fundamental buyers in the futures market; and cross-market arbitrageurs who transferred
this sell pressure to the equities markets by opportunistically buying E-mini contracts and
simultaneously selling products like [the] SPY [(S&P 500 exchange-traded fund (“ETF”))],
or selling individual equities in the S&P 500 Index. [. . . ] Between 2:32 p.m. and 2:45
p.m., as prices of the E-mini rapidly declined, the Sell Algorithm sold about 35,000 E-
mini contracts (valued at approximately $1.9 billion) of the 75,000 intended. [. . . ] By
2:45:28 there were less than 1,050 contracts of buy-side resting orders in the E-mini,
representing less than 1% of buy-side market depth observed at the beginning of the
day. [. . . ] At 2:45:28 p.m., trading on the E-mini was paused for five seconds when the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) Stop Logic Functionality was triggered in order to
prevent a cascade of further price declines.1 [. . . ] When trading resumed at 2:45:33 p.m.,
prices stabilized and shortly thereafter, the E-mini began to recover, followed by the SPY.
[. . . ] Even though after 2:45 p.m. prices in the E-mini and SPY were recovering from their
severe declines, sell orders placed for some individual securities and ETFs (including many
retail stop-loss orders, triggered by declines in prices of those securities) found reduced
1The CME’s Globex Stop Logic Functionality is an automated pre-trade safeguard procedure de-
signed to prevent the execution of cascading stop orders that would cause “excessive” declines or in-
creases in prices due to lack of sufficient depth in the central limit order book. In the context of this
functionality,“excessive” is defined as being outside of a predetermined “no bust” range. The no bust
range varies from contract to contract; for the E-mini, it was set at 6 index points (24 ticks) in either
direction. After Stop Logic Functionality is triggered, trading is paused for a certain period of time as
the matching engine goes into what is called a “reserve state.” The length of the trading pause varies
between 5 and 20 seconds from contract to contract; it was set at 5 seconds for the E-mini. During the
reserve state, orders can be submitted, modified, or cancelled, but no executions can take place. The
matching engine exits the reserve state by initiating the same auction opening procedure as it does at
the beginning of each trading day. After the starting price is determined by the re-opening auction, the
matching engine returns to the standard continuous matching protocol.
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buying interest, which led to further price declines in those securities. [. . . ] [B]etween
2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., over 20,000 trades (many based on retail-customer orders) across
more than 300 separate securities, including many ETFs, were executed at prices 60% or
more away from their 2:40 p.m. prices. [. . . ] By 3:08 p.m., [. . . ] the E-mini prices [were]
back to nearly their pre-drop level [. . . and] most securities had reverted back to trading
at prices reflecting true consensus values.”
To illustrate the large and temporary decline in prices and the corresponding increase
in trading volume on May 6, Figure 1 presents end-of-minute transaction prices (solid
line) and minute-by-minute trading volume (dashed line) in the E-mini on May 6.
<Insert Figure 1>
The accumulation of the largest daily net short position of the year by a single trader
over a matter of minutes can be thought of as a period of large and temporary selling
pressure. Theory suggests that a period of large and temporary selling pressure can
trigger a market crash even in the absence of a fundamental shock. Building on the
Grossman and Miller (1988) framework, Huang and Wang (2008) develop an equilib-
rium model that links the cost of maintaining continuous market presence with market
crashes even in the absence of fundamental shocks and with perfectly offsetting idiosyn-
cratic shocks. In their model, market crashes emerge endogenously when a sudden excess
of sell orders overwhelms the insufficient risk-bearing capacity of market makers. Be-
cause the provision of continuous market presence is costly, market makers choose to
maintain equilibrium risk exposures that are too low to offset large but temporary liq-
uidity imbalances. In the event of a large enough sell order, the liquidity on the buy side
can only be obtained after a price drop that is large enough to compensate increasingly
reluctant market makers for taking on additional risky inventory.
Weill (2007) presents an equilibrium model of optimal dynamic inventory adjustment
of competitive capital-constrained intermediaries faced with large and temporary selling
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pressure. This framework begins with an exogenous negative aggregate shock to outside
investors’ marginal utility of holding the asset, which leads to a sharp price drop. During
and immediately following the price drop, there is no change in intermediaries’ invento-
ries. As intermediaries anticipate that the marginal utilities of some outside investors’
will begin to increase and the selling pressure will subside, they find it optimal to dy-
namically accumulate a long position, during which time market prices rise. They then
unwind their inventory just as market prices reach their initial level. As shown in Figure
1 of Weill (2007), the co-movement between intermediary inventories and prices varies
over time, suggesting that this relationship is dynamic. More generally, Nagel (2012)
shows that return reversals are related to the risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries.
Intermediation is an essential function in markets in which buyers and sellers do
not arrive simultaneously. As technology has transformed the way financial assets are
traded, intermediation has been increasingly provided by market participants without
formal obligations. An important question is how nondesignated intraday intermediaries
behave during periods of large and temporary buying or selling pressure in automated
financial markets.
In this paper, we empirically examine intraday market intermediation in an electronic
market before and during a period of large and temporary selling pressure.2 We use
audit trail account-level transaction data in the E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures
2We use the term intraday intermediation instead of market making or liquidity provision because
the two latter terms have become associated with affirmative obligations to provide two-sided quotes,
serve a customer base, and maintain “fair and orderly markets.” Market making has also been formally
recognized in a plethora of government regulations, regulations by self-regulatory organizations, and
court decisions. Intraday intermediation, in contrast, does not necessarily entail designated market
making or mandatory liquidity provision. Intraday intermediation can be provided by not only desig-
nated market makers, but also by proprietary traders trading exclusively for their own trading accounts
without acting in any agency capacity such as, for example, routing customer order flow or providing
customer advice (see Committee on the Global Financial System (2014)). The term intraday interme-
diation is also distinct from the notion of financial intermediation, which refers to the process of asset
transformation “by purchasing assets and selling liabilities” (see Madhavan (2000)).
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market over the period May 3 through 6, 2010.3 Guided by the literature on inventory
management by intermediaries (see O’Hara (1995) and Hasbrouck (2006), among others),
we classify trading accounts that do not accumulate large directional positions and whose
inventories display mean-reversion during May 3 through 5 as intraday intermediaries.
If an account is classified as an intermediary on any of these three days, we keep it in
the same category on May 6, 2010. Importantly, this approach does not require that
an intermediary maintain low inventory on the day of the Flash Crash. We further
separate intraday intermediaries into High Frequency Traders and Market Makers.4 As
their category name suggests, High Frequency Traders participate in a markedly larger
proportion of trading than Market Makers.5
Theory suggests that intermediaries optimally adjust inventory in relation to falling
prices. If the intermediaries’ risk-bearing capacity is overwhelmed, they become un-
willing to accumulate more inventory without large price concessions. Consistent with
the theory of limited risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries, the combined net inven-
tories of the accounts classified as intraday intermediaries over the four days of our
sample, including May 6, did not exceed 6,000 E-mini contracts – a sum that is an order
of magnitude smaller than the large sell program of 75,000 contracts documented in
CFTC-SEC (2010b). In contrast to Weill (2007), during the period of large and tempo-
rary selling pressure on May 6, we find that both categories of intraday intermediaries
also accumulate net long inventory positions as prices decline.
To examine the dynamic risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries before and during
3The CFTC-SEC report’s narrative of the Flash Crash in the E-mini was based in part on the
preliminary analysis contained in the original version of this paper (see footnote 22 of CFTC-SEC
(2010b).
4Throughout the paper we employ the following convention: we use upper case letters whenever we
refer to the categories that we define, e.g., Market Makers and High Frequency Traders and lower case
letters whenever we refer to general type of activity, e.g., market making and high frequency trading.
5Accounts classified as High Frequency Traders based on inventory and volume patterns might be
representative of a subset of all high frequency trading strategies.
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the Flash Crash, we empirically study the second-by-second co-movement of their inven-
tory changes and price changes over May 3 through 6. We find that inventory changes
of High Frequency Traders exhibit a statistically significant relationship with both con-
temporaneous and lagged price changes and that this relationship did not change when
prices fell during the Flash Crash. However, the statistical relationship between Market
Maker inventory changes and price changes did change during the Flash Crash compared
with the previous three days.
Moreover, we find that inventory changes of Market Makers are negatively related to
contemporaneous price changes, consistent with theories of traditional market making
(see Hendershott and Seasholes (2007), among others). In contrast, inventory changes of
High Frequency Traders are positively related to contemporaneous price changes. Fou-
cault, Roell, and Sandas (2003), Menkveld and Zoican (2016), and Budish, Cramton,
and Shim (2015) provide theoretical mechanisms through which the inventories of inter-
mediaries may positively co-move with price changes at high frequencies. These studies
suggest that if certain traders can react marginally faster to a signal, they can adversely
select stale quotes of marginally slower market makers, engaging in “stale quote snip-
ing” or “latency arbitrage.” Consequently, faster traders are able to trade ahead of price
changes at short time horizons.
Consistent with the theory of “stale quote sniping,” we find that over May 3 through
5, when High Frequency Traders are net buyers in a given second, prices increase in the
following second and remain higher over the subsequent 20 seconds. We examine the
extent to which High Frequency Traders’ trading activity precedes price changes and
find that High Frequency Traders lift a disproportionate amount of the final best ask
depth before an increase in the best ask level and provide a disproportionate proportion
of depth first transacted against at the new price level.
Our main contribution is empirically studying theories of intermediation during a pe-
6
riod of large and temporary selling pressure. The closest studies to ours are Brogaard,
Hendershott, and Riordan (2016), who study high frequency traders as classified by NAS-
DAQ during the 2008 short-sale ban and Brogaard et al. (2016), who study the activity
of high frequency traders as classified by NASDAQ around extreme price movements.6
In contrast, we focus on trading during the Flash Crash in the inclusive, centralized E-
mini market with individual account IDs and use the entire universe of trading accounts.
Our analysis makes use of a detailed and comprehensive set of transaction-level data in
the E-mini three days before and on the day of the Flash Crash. Focusing on trading in
the E-mini during the Flash Crash provides two additional advantages. Unlike the U.S.
equity markets, there are no market maker obligations in the fully electronic E-mini.
Thus, a focus on trading in the E-mini during the Flash Crash may help us understand
the potential implications of not imposing market making obligations as markets be-
come more automated, especially during periods of market stress. Furthermore, all of
the trading in the E-mini takes place in one venue. Consequently, our results are not
affected by the fragmentation of trading, and we are able to study the entire universe of
6Since the release of CFTC-SEC (2010b), a number of studies have examined the Flash Crash.
For example, Madhavan (2012) studies the propagation of the Flash Crash to ETFs where trades were
disproportionately broken and finds that ETFs that traded at stub quote price levels were characterized
by a relatively high degree of trading fragmentation. Menkveld and Yueshen (2016) study the trading
of the large sell program during the Flash Crash and argue that the arbitrage relationship between the
E-mini and the S&P 500 ETF (SPY) may have broken down during the Flash Crash and subsequent
recovery. Easley, Lopez, and O’Hara (2011) apply the Volume Synchronized Probability of Informed
Trading (VPIN) measure to the day of the Flash Crash and find abnormal levels of “order-flow toxicity”
in the hours leading up to the crash. Market data vendor and commentator Nanex also analyzes trading
during the Flash Crash and argues that the large fundamental seller never submitted marketable orders.
In contrast, Menkveld and Yueshen (2016) document that “half of the sell orders were limit orders, the
other half market orders.” While these studies contribute to our overall understanding of how the Flash
Crash became a systemic financial marketwide event, we focus on the trading of intraday intermediaries
in the stock index futures market, where, according to the CFTC–SEC (2010b) report, the triggering
event occurred.
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trading of a given account in the E-mini June 2010 contract.7
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we discuss the market
structure of the E-mini and the data employed in this paper. In Section II, we present
our empirical methodology and results. In Section III, we conclude.
I. Institutional Background and Data
A. The E-mini S&P 500 Futures Market
The CME introduced the E-mini contract in 1997. The E-mini owes its name to
the fact that it is traded electronically and in denominations five times smaller than
the original S&P 500 futures contract. Since its introduction, the E-mini has become
a popular instrument to hedge exposures to baskets of U.S. stocks or to speculate on
the direction of the entire stock market. The E-mini contract attracts the highest dollar
volume among U.S. equity index products (futures, options, or exchange-traded funds).
Hasbrouck (2003) shows that of all U.S. equity index products, the E-mini contributes
the most to the price discovery of the U.S. stock market. The contracts are cash-
settled against the value of the underlying S&P 500 equity index at expiration dates in
March, June, September, and December of each year. The contract with the nearest
expiration date, which attracts the majority of trading activity, is called the “front-
month” contract. In May 2010, the front-month contract was the contract expiring in
7A number of studies have analyzed the behavior of high frequency traders as classified by NASDAQ
using data from NASDAQ exchanges only (see Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014, 2016),
Carrion (2013), Hirschey (2016) and Brogaard et al. (2016), inter alia). However, as of the end of
Q3, 2010, trading on NASDAQ exchanges represented approximately a third of Tape C (the tape for
NASDAQ stocks) trading volume. Our approach also differs from studies that attempt to infer the
behavior of high frequency traders from aggregate market data (see Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), and Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang (2015), inter alia). We are also able
to study the trading of all accounts active in the E-mini rather than the trading of one high frequency
trader or institutional investor (see Menkveld (2013) and Menkveld, and Yueshen (2016), respectively).
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June 2010. The notional value of one E-mini contract is $50 multiplied by the S&P
500 stock index. During May 3 - 6, 2010, the S&P 500 index fluctuated slightly above
1,000 points, making each E-mini contract worth about $50,000. The minimum price
increment, or “tick” size, of the E-mini is 0.25 index points, or $12.50; a price move of one
tick represents a fluctuation of about 2.5 basis points. The E-mini trades exclusively on
the CME Globex trading platform, a fully electronic limit order market. Trading takes
place 24 hours a day with the exception of one 15-minute technical maintenance break
each day. The CME Globex matching algorithm for the E-mini follows a “price-time
priority” rule in that orders offering more favorable prices are executed ahead of orders
with less favorable prices, and orders with the same prices are executed in the order they
were received by Globex. The market for the E-mini features both pre- and post-trade
transparency. Pre-trade transparency is provided by transmitting to the public in real
time the quantities and prices for buy and sell orders resting in the central limit order
book up or down 10 tick levels from the last transaction price. Post-trade transparency
is provided by transmitting to the public prices and quantities of executed transactions.
The identities of individual traders submitting, canceling, or modifying bids and offers,
as well as those whose orders have been executed, are not made available to the public.
B. Data
Our sample consists of intraday audit trail transaction-level data for the E-mini S&P
500 June 2010 futures contract for the sample period spanning May 3 - 6, 2010. These
data come from the Trade Capture Report (TCR), which the CME provides to the
CFTC.8 For each of the four days, we examine all regular transactions occurring during
8Due to the highly confidential nature of these data and commonality across certain trading accounts,
we aggregate trading accounts into trader categories. Prior to the release of this paper, all matters
related to the aggregation of data, presentation of results, and sharing of the results with the public
were reviewed by the CFTC.
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the 405-minute period starting at the opening of the market for the underlying stocks at
8:30 a.m. CT (CME Globex is in the Central Time Zone) or 9:30 a.m. ET and ending at
the time of the technical maintenance break at 3:15 p.m. CT, 15 minutes after the close
of trading in the underlying stocks. For each transaction, we use fields with the account
identifiers for the buyer and the seller, the price and quantity transacted, the date and
time (to the nearest second), a sequence ID number that sorts trades into chronological
order within one second, a field indicating whether the trade resulted from a limit (both
marketable and nonmarketable) or market order, an order ID that assigns multiple trade
executions to the original order, and an “aggressiveness” indicator stamped by the CME
Globex matching engine as “N” for a resting order and “Y” for an order that executed
against a resting order. We do not study message-level data and, thus, do not observe
activity for orders that did not execute.
C. Descriptive Statistics
Market-level descriptive statistics are presented in Table I. We report statistics sepa-
rately for May 3 to 5 and May 6. Statistics in the May 3 to 5 column represent three-day
averages.
<Insert Table I>
Trading volume and the number of trades on May 6 were more than double the
average daily trading volume over the previous three days. Volatility measured as the
log of the intraday price range was also significantly larger on May 6.9 The average
trade size on both May 3 - 5 and May 6 was approximately five contracts. Over 90%
9In the Internet Appendix, we present the daily five-minute realized variance of the SPY for 2004
to 2013 and find that the daily realized variances observed on May 3 - 5 were not abnormal.
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of trading and trading volume were executed via limit orders (both marketable and
non-marketable).
II. Methodology and Results
We classify over 15,000 unique accounts trading in the E-mini into intraday inter-
mediaries and other categories of traders to provide an empirical analysis of intraday
intermediation before and during the Flash Crash. We then study the behavior of the
most active intermediaries defined as High Frequency Traders in more detail.
A. Trader Categories
Over 15,000 unique accounts traded in the E-mini during our sample period. Traders
in the E-mini, including those that buy and sell throughout a trading day, do not have
formal designations such as market makers, dealers, or specialists. To classify accounts
as intraday intermediaries, we adopt a data-driven approach based on trading activity
and inventory patterns. Our definition of intraday intermediaries is designed to capture
traders who follow a strategy of consistently buying and selling throughout a trading
day while maintaining low levels of inventory.10
Market intermediaries can be broadly defined as “traders who can fill gaps arising
from imperfect synchronization between the arrivals of buyers and sellers” (see Gross-
man and Miller (1988)). This definition implies that intermediaries often participate in a
significant proportion of transactions (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985))
and that intermediaries’ inventories are mean-reverting at a relatively high frequency
(see Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), and Ho and Stoll (1983), among
10We use a broad definition of intermediation to classify accounts as intraday intermediaries that does
not use the relationship between intermediary trading and prices or price fluctuations.
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others). Empirically, intraday mean-reversion in inventories and relatively high trading
volume are salient characteristics of intermediation (see Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993),
and Madhavan and Smidt (1993)). A growing literature on the most active intermedi-
aries variously defines them as fast traders, high frequency traders, or high frequency
market makers (see Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2016), Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016),
Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015), as well as empirical studies by Menkveld (2013),
Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014), and Carrion (2013), and a survey by Jones
(2013)).
A trader is classified as an intraday intermediary if it holds small intraday and end-
of-day net positions relative to its daily trading volume over May 3 - 5, 2010, irrespective
of its trading behavior on May 6. To be classified as an intraday intermediary, a trader
denoted by j must meet criteria (i) with respect to its daily trading volume (V olj,d),
where d denotes a trading day, (ii) with respect to its end-of-day position (NPj,d,t=405)
relative to its daily trading volume, where t denotes each minute during a trading day,
and (iii) with respect to its intraday minute-by-minute inventory (NPj,d,t) pattern.
We set the following specific levels for each criterion (to simplify notation, we suppress
the subscript j and set beginning-of-day inventories for all trading accounts to zero
(NPj,d,t=0 = 0)):
(i) An account must trade 10 or more contracts on at least one of the three days
prior to the Flash Crash (May 3, 4, and 5, 2010).
V old ≥ 10,
According to the data, this volume cutoff is a conservative way to first remove ac-
counts that do not trade an economically significant amount before categorizing intraday
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intermediaries.11
(ii) The three-day average of the absolute value of the ratio of the account’s end-of-
day net position to its daily trading volume must not exceed 5%.
3∑
d=1
|NPd,t=405|
V old
3
≤ 5%.
Specifically, we compute the daily ratio of a trader’s end-of-day position to its daily
trading volume on May 3, 4, and 5, compute the absolute value of the ratios for each
day, and calculate the three-day average of the absolute values of the ratio.
(iii) The three-day average of the square root of the account’s daily mean of squared
end-of-minute net position deviations from its end-of-day net position over its daily
trading volume must not exceed 0.5%.
3∑
d=1
√
1
405
405∑
t=1
(
NPd,t−NPd,t=405
V old
)2
3
≤ 0.5%.
These cutoff levels are specific to our sample and may need to be adjusted if applied
in other markets.12
Of the accounts that are classified as intraday intermediaries, we further classify the
16 most active accounts, that is, those with the highest number of trades over May 3 -
11In setting the volume cutoff, there is a tradeoff. On the one hand, the number of contracts traded
needs to be large enough to ensure that economically small traders are not mistakenly categorized as
intraday intermediaries, but not so high that accounts characterized by consistent buying and selling
are mistakenly categorized as Small Traders. Using a back-of-the-envelope approximation from Table
II, the average number of contracts traded per day by an average Small Trader is 1.98 ((2,397,639 ×
0.005)/6,065 ≈ 1.98). The corresponding approximation for intraday intermediaries is 5,255 contracts
((2,397,639 × 0.4471)/204 ≈ 5,255). There is a significant difference between these different types of
categories in the data. However, rather than making the volume cutoff larger, we apply two additional
criteria that also link to the theory and empirical evidence of intermediation.
12Kirilenko, Mankad, and Michailidis (2013) confirm the qualitative intuition of our classification
using a dynamic unsupervised machine learning method that does not rely on user-specified cutoffs.
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5, as High Frequency Traders.13 The other intraday intermediary accounts are classified
as Market Makers. A High Frequency Trader is thus similar to a Market Maker in
all respects, except that High Frequency Traders participate in a significantly greater
number of trades.14 If an account is classified as a High Frequency Trader or a Market
Maker over May 3 - 5, 2010, it remains in the same category for May 6, 2010, as well.
As previously mentioned, this restriction does not require that a High Frequency Trader
or a Marker Maker maintain low inventory relative to volume on the day of the Flash
Crash.15
We classify all other traders as Small Traders, Fundamental Buyers, and Fundamental
Sellers. We call the remaining accounts Opportunistic Traders. Unlike High Frequency
Traders and Market Makers, these trader categories are classified separately for each of
the four trading days, including May 6, 2010.16
On each day, an account is classified as a Small Trader if it trades fewer than 10
contracts. Over 6,000 out of the 15,000 accounts are classified as Small Traders. The
13Results are qualitatively similar when we classify the most active accounts based on trading volume.
According to Figure 2 below, there is also a large difference in the trading volume between the 16th
and 17th ranked intraday intermediaries in terms of daily trading volume.
14High Frequency Traders trade significantly more frequently than any other trader category, includ-
ing Market Makers. Over May 3 - 5, 15 High Frequency Traders were active on average. The three-day
average of the High Frequency Traders’ daily number of trades per second is 5.98. In contrast, over May
3 - 5, 189 Market Makers were active on average and the three-day average of the Market Makers’ daily
number of trades per second is 2.14. These estimates suggest that on average a High Frequency Trader
trades about 30 times more often than a Market Maker. While we do not observe the messages or latency
of traders with our data, Clark-Joseph (2014) applies our classification methodology to message-level
data and confirms that High Frequency Traders submit messages in the millisecond environment. Hayes
et al. (2012) confirm our classification with simulated data calibrated on the E-mini.
15Sixteen unique accounts were classified as High Frequency Traders over May 3 - 6, of which, 14 of
the 16 accounts traded on May 3, all 16 accounts traded on May 4, and 15 of the 16 accounts traded on
May 5. No new accounts that satisfy the criteria of High Frequency Traders enter the E-mini on May
6. The accounts classified as High Frequency Traders based on inventory and volume patterns may be
representative of a subset of all high frequency trading strategies as defined by the SEC (2014) concept
release on market structure.
16The rationale for classifying Small, Fundamental, or Opportunistic traders separately each day
is that they may trade only on one day. It is also possible that the same account can be classified
differently on different days. For example, an account can be a Fundamental Buyer on one day, a Small
Trader on another day, and a Fundamental Seller or Opportunistic Trader on yet another day.
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Small Traders category likely captures retail traders (see Kaniel, Saar, and Titman
(2008), and Seasholes and Zhu (2010) among others). Small Traders account for less
than 1% of the total trading volume in our sample.
On each day, an account is classified as a Fundamental Buyer if it trades 10 contracts
or more and accumulates a net long end-of-day position equal to at least 15% of its total
trading volume for the day. Similarly, an account is classified as a Fundamental Seller
if it trades 10 contracts or more and the absolute value of its net short position at the
end of the day is at least 15% of its total trading volume for the day. This category is
meant to capture accounts that accumulate significant directional positions on a given
day and most likely reflects trading patterns of institutional investors with longer holding
horizons (see Anand et al. (2013), and Puckett and Yan (2011), among others).
The remaining accounts are categorized as Opportunistic Traders. Opportunistic
Traders move in and out of positions throughout the day but adjust their net holdings
with significantly larger fluctuations and lower frequency than intraday intermediaries.
Opportunistic Traders may follow a variety of arbitrage trading strategies, including
cross-market arbitrage (for example, long futures/short securities), statistical arbitrage,
and news arbitrage (buy if the news indicators are positive/sell if the news indicators
are negative). Opportunistic Traders may also engage in providing intermediation across
days or weeks rather than intraday.
Our classification methodology is based entirely on directly observed individual in-
ventory and trading volume patterns of traders. Unlike many other markets, traders
in our data set do not have designations due to regulatory, reporting, or other manda-
tory or voluntary disclosure requirements. In that regard, our classification differs from
papers that use NASDAQ data, which classify high frequency traders using a variety
of qualitative and quantitative criteria, or the approach of Biais, Declerck, and Moinas
(2016) which uses a combination of a proprietary/agency flag along with quantitative
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criteria. Our approach also differs from those that use only qualitative criteria to iden-
tify traders such as Kurov and Lasser (2004), who use a proprietary/agency code, Joint
Staff Report (2015) on the October 15 “Flash Rally” in U.S. Treasuries, which classifies
accounts based on their organizational structure or Chaboud et al. (2014), who use a
flag provided by a trading platform.
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of two of our classification dimensions:
trading activity and end-of-day positions for all but the Small Traders, whose activity is
negligible. The four panels correspond to each of the four trading days. The shaded areas
are stylistically drawn to cover the areas populated by the individual trading accounts
that fall into each of the categories based on their trading volume (vertical axis) and
end-of-day position scaled by market trading volume (horizontal axis).17
<Insert Figure 2>
According to Figure 2, the ecosystem of the E-mini market consists of five fairly
distinct clusters of traders: Fundamental Buyers, Fundamental Sellers, High Frequency
Traders, Opportunistic Traders, and Market Makers. In terms of their trading activity,
High Frequency Traders stand out from all the other trading categories and are clearly
distinct from Market Makers. By accumulating a significant negative inventory, the
cloud of Fundamental Sellers spreads out to the left of the origin, while the cloud of
Fundamental Buyers spreads out to the right. Opportunistic Traders overlap to some
extent with all of the other categories of traders.
Average indicators of trading activity for all categories of traders are presented in
Table II. Panel A presents averages for the three days prior to the Flash Crash (May 3
17For confidentiality reasons, we do not present trading volume or net position of individual accounts.
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to 5, 2010), while Panel B presents indicators for the day of the Flash Crash (May 6,
2010).
<Insert Table II>
According to Table II, during the three days prior to the Flash Crash, 15 High
Frequency Traders on average accounted for an average of 34.22% of the total trading
volume and 189 Market Makers, on average accounted for an additional 10.49% of total
trading volume. On the day of the Flash Crash, their respective shares of total trading
volume dropped to 28.57% and 9.00%, respectively.18
Table II also presents average trade-weighted and volume-weighted “Aggressiveness
Ratios,” defined as the percentage of trades or contracts in which a side of the trade was
the marketable side as opposed to a nonexecutable (that is, passive or resting). Over
May 3 to 5, 2010, the three-day average of the volume-weighted proportions of aggressive
trade executions by High Frequency Traders and Market Makers are 49.86% and 34.99%,
respectively. On May 6, 2010, the proportions are only slightly different at 46.59% and
32.49%, respectively.19 On May 6, trades of Fundamental Sellers resulted from markedly
larger portions of orders that were executed than the other trader categories. Over 99%
of High Frequency Traders’ and Market Makers’ trades result from limit orders, while
only 65% of Small Traders’ trades result from limit orders.
B. Intermediation and the Flash Crash
Theory links liquidity crashes to the risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries. Huang
and Wang (2008, 2010) develop an equilibrium framework in which market crashes
18Some accounts classified as Market Makers for May 3 to 5 did not trade on May 6.
19During the re-opening auction after the triggering of the Stop Logic Functionality on May 6, 2010,
both sides of transactions were marked as passive.
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emerge endogenously when a sudden excess of sell orders overwhelms the insufficient
risk-bearing capacity of market makers. Further, Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2016) link el-
evated price volatility with tighter inventory bounds for “high frequency” intermediaries,
reflecting their capacity to bear risk associated with increased volatility.
The risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries can be identified by the observed bounds
of their net positions.20 Figure 3 presents the end-of-minute net inventories of Market
Makers and High Frequency Traders alongside the price level of the E-mini. The dashed
lines plot Market Makers’ and High Frequency Traders’ net positions, while the solid
lines plot the price level of the E-mini. The top four panels present the net position of
Market Makers over May 3 to 6, while the bottom four panels present the net positions
of High Frequency Traders.
<Insert Figure 3>
On each of the four days in our sample, High Frequency Traders never accumulated
inventories greater than approximately 4,000 contracts, which is much smaller than the
size of the 75,000-contract order of the large sell program documented in CFTC-SEC
(2010b).21 Similarly, Market Makers do not take on net inventories that exceed 1,500
contracts in either direction. These findings are consistent with the theory of the limited
20See, for example, the inventory control models such as those in Amihud and Mendelson (1980)
and Ho and Stoll (1983), among others. For empirical analysis, see Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), among others.
21In the Internet Appendix, we also document an approximately 30,000-contract trade imbalance
between Fundamental Sellers and Fundamental Buyers in the minutes leading up to the Flash Crash.
This imbalance is nearly an order of magnitude larger than the documented inventory capacity of
High Frequency Traders. In addition, we show that the majority of the Fundamental Trader trade
imbalance was picked up by Opportunistic Traders, who may be able to take on larger inventories in
the E-mini because they are simultaneously selling shares in equity markets in order to conduct cross-
market arbitrage. The most active Opportunistic Traders in our sample also took on significant long
inventories during the Flash Crash, likely while engaging in cross-market arbitrage. We present their
net inventories under the title “High Frequency Arbitragers” in the Internet Appendix. Our results are
consistent with the notion that the imbalance between Fundamental Sellers and Buyers was larger than
the risk-bearing capacity of both High Frequency Traders and Market Makers.
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risk-bearing capacity of intermediaries during a liquidity crash, as intraday intermedi-
aries did not take on larger inventories compared with their pre-May 6 inventories. In
contrast to Weill (2007), during the period of large and temporary selling pressure on
May 6, we find that both categories of intraday intermediaries also accumulate net long
inventory positions as prices decline.22
On May 6, as discussed in CFTC-SEC (2010b), shortly before the Stop Logic Func-
tionality was triggered during the Flash Crash, High Frequency Traders aggressively
liquidated approximately 2,000 contracts accumulated earlier, which coincided with sig-
nificant additional price declines. In contrast, Market Makers did not liquidate the
inventories that they had accumulated in the early minutes of the Flash Crash until
after the Stop Logic Functionality was activated.23
To empirically examine the risk-bearing capacity of intraday intermediaries before
and during the Flash Crash, we examine the second-by-second co-movement between
the inventory changes of High Frequency Traders and Market Makers and market prices.
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) estimate vector autoregressions that include price changes,
signed orders, and NYSE specialist inventory positions. More recently, Hendershott and
Menkveld (2014) examine dynamics between the NYSE specialist inventories and prices,
and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) examine co-movements between high
frequency traders as defined by NASDAQ and price changes, further decomposing price
changes into permanent and temporary price changes.
We employ an empirically similar approach to establish a baseline statistical relation-
ship between changes in inventories and changes in prices over May 3 to 5, 2010. With
this baseline analysis, we simply examine the co-movement of intraday intermediary in-
22The partial consistency of our empirical results with Weill (2007) could be due to the fact the Flash
Crash takes place in an automated central limit order market, while Weill (2007) studies a market in
which outside investors must be connected to each other by intermediaries.
23For additional description of the trading activity during the seconds prior to the activation of the
Stop Logic Functionality, see the Internet Appendix.
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ventories and price changes without making causal inferences, as prices and inventories
are jointly determined. We employ this baseline analysis separately for High Frequency
Traders and Market Makers to account for possible differences in statistical relationships.
Our baseline inventory and price regression is given as24
∆yt = α + φ ·∆yt−1 + δ · yt−1 +
20∑
i=0
[βi ·∆pt−i/0.25] + t, (1)
where yt and ∆yt denote the inventories and changes in inventories of High Frequency
Traders or Market Makers for each second of a trading day, t = 0 corresponds to the
opening of stock trading on the NYSE at 8:30:00 a.m. CT (9:30:00 ET) and t = 24, 300
denotes the close of Globex at 15:15:00 CT (4:15:00 p.m. ET), and ∆pt denotes the
price change in index point units between the high-low midpoint of second t− 1 and the
high-low midpoint of second t to account for bid-ask bounce. To convert price changes
into the number of ticks, we divide ∆p by 0.25.25 We present t-statistics obtained from
White (1980) standard errors.26
<Insert Table III>
In all baseline specifications, the regression coefficient on the lagged intermediary
inventory level is negative, reflecting the mean-reversion of High Frequency Trader and
Market Maker inventories. High Frequency Trader inventory changes are positively re-
lated to contemporaneous and lagged price changes in both specifications up to four
lags. By the 10th lagged price change, High Frequency Traders inventory changes be-
come negatively related to price changes. In contrast, Market Maker inventory changes
24To allay concerns of nonstationarity, we first-difference intraday intermediary inventories and market
prices.
25For reference, we also estimate the same regressions without the contemporaneous price change.
See the Internet Appendix.
26In Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, we reject the null of a unit root for all variables.
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are negatively related to contemporaneous price changes but are generally positively
related to lagged price changes.27 Hendershott and Seasholes (2007) argue that market
makers are willing to accommodate trades to less patient investors only if they are able
to buy (sell) at a discount (premium) relative to future prices. Thus, the inventories
of intermediaries should coincide with buying and selling pressure, which causes price
movements that subsequently reverse themselves, implying a negative contemporaneous
relationship between market maker inventories and prices. Although the co-movement
between Market Maker inventory changes and price changes fits this paradigm, its High
Frequency Trader counterpart does not. The fact that the regression coefficients of High
Frequency Traders lagged inventory levels are larger than their Market Maker counter-
parts may speak to the difference in holding horizon and inventory mean-reversion of
these two categories.28
To test whether the statistical relationship between intermediary inventory changes
and price changes significantly changed during the Flash Crash, we estimate the following
regressions:
∆yt = α + φ∆yt−1 + δyt−1 + Σ20i=0[βi × pt−i/0.25]
+DDt {αD + φD∆yt−1 + δDyt−1 + Σ20i=0[βDi × pt−i/0.25]}
+DUt {αU + φU∆yt−1 + δUyt−1 + Σ20i=0[βUi × pt−i/0.25]}+ t.
In these regressions, we stack observations from May 3, May 4, May 5, and May 6
and include two sets of interaction terms, DDt and D
U
t . where D
D
t corresponds to the
27The contemporaneous price change coefficient for High Frequency Traders is statistically distin-
guishable from its Market Maker counterpart at the 1% level.
28Results are qualitatively similar when we when we incorporate lead price changes in these regressions
and when we include more price change and inventory lags. See the Internet Appendix.
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“down” period of the Flash Crash and DUt corresponds to the “up” period (between
13:32:00 and 13:45:28 CT and between 13:45:33 and 14:08:00 CT, respectively).29 The
interaction coefficients measure differences between the coefficient estimates for the re-
spective periods of the Flash Crash and for the non-Flash Crash periods. Results are
presented in Table IV.
<Insert Table IV>
For High Frequency Traders, during the “down” phase of the Flash Crash, all inter-
action coefficients except for the fourth lagged price change are statistically insignificant
- that is, the statistical relationship between High Frequency Traders’ inventory changes
and price changes did not significantly change in the seconds during which the price of
the E-mini fell. During the “up” phase, which commenced after a five-second pause in
trading, seven coefficients changed - notably, the coefficients on the interaction terms
of the contemporaneous price change and the first two lagged price change interaction
coefficients are negative and significant. We construct an F-test from the R2 estimated
from the baseline regression presented in Table III and fail to reject the null that the
interaction coefficients are jointly distinguishable from zero, lending little evidence to
the view that High Frequency Traders’ trading pattern changed.30
In contrast to High Frequency Traders, the contemporaneous and lagged price change
interaction coefficients are statistically significant for Market Makers during both the
“down” and “up” phases of the Flash Crash. During the “down” and “up” phases, the
correlation between the Market Maker inventory changes and contemporaneous prices
29Since we study intraday intermediation before and during the Flash Crash, we exclude the obser-
vations after 14:08:00 (CT) on May 6.
30In the Internet Appendix, we document that it is the “down” phase of the Flash Crash that best
corresponds to the period of large and temporary selling pressure, as the net selling of Fundamental Sell-
ers exceeds the net buying of Fundamental Buyers by 33,944 contracts. Only one interaction coefficient
is statistically significant for High Frequency Traders during this period
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increased, while the correlation between the lagged prices and inventories decreased.
The net effect of these positive and negative changes (sum of the significant coefficients)
is close to zero, suggesting that the co-movement between Market Maker inventories and
prices appears to have shifted down the lag structure. We construct an F-test from the
R2 estimated from the baseline regression presented in Table III and reject the null that
the interaction coefficients are jointly distinguishable from zero at the 1% level.
The change in co-movement between Market Makers’ inventories and prices during
the Flash Crash is consistent with the theory of liquidity crashes when intermediation
is endogenous. CFTC-SEC (2010b) also indicates a reduced number of Market Makers
during periods of the Flash Crash. In contrast, the mean-reversion of High Frequency
Traders’ inventory, as well as the co-movement between the inventories of High Frequency
Traders and market prices did not significantly change during the Flash Crash.
C. High Frequency Traders
To better understand High Frequency Traders’ responses to the Flash Crash, we
conduct additional empirical analyses of their intraday trading behavior. A developing
theoretical literature models the behavior of High Frequency Traders differently than
that of a traditional market marker. Broadly speaking, in these models faster intraday
traders are able to “snipe” stale orders of slower market participants (see, for example,
Foucault, Roell, and Sandas (2003), Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010), Budish, Cramton,
and Shim (2015), and Menkveld and Zoican (2016)). Quote sniping provides an economic
rationale through which the inventories of faster intraday traders may positively co-move
with price changes at high frequencies. Empirically, Harris and Schultz (1998) study the
trading of the so-called SOES Bandits who picked off stale dealer quotes in NASDAQ
stocks. A testable empirical pattern consistent with these predictions entails certain
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traders regularly trading ahead of price changes at short time horizons.
We conduct two sets of tests that further analyze the statistical relationship between
changes in the net positions of High Frequency Traders and market prices at very short
time horizons. In the first set of tests, we analyze how prices change up to 20 seconds
after High Frequency Traders trade. Figure 4 illustrates the results. The upper-left panel
presents results for High Frequency Traders buy events over May 3 to 5, the upper-right
panel presents results for High Frequency Traders buy events on May 6, and the lower-
left and lower-right panels present corresponding results for High Frequency Traders sell
events.31
<Insert Figure 4>
When High Frequency Traders are net buyers over May 3 to 5, prices rise by 17%
of a tick in the next second then begin to gradually fall; 20 seconds after a net buy by
High Frequency Traders, prices remain 15% of a tick higher. The total effect of net buy
High Frequency Traders’ trades can be separated into net aggressive and net passive
buy trades. When High Frequency Traders buy aggressively, prices rise by 20% of a
tick in the next second, continue rising into the next second, stabilize at about 23% of
a tick during seconds 2 to 11, and then begin to gradually fall; 20 seconds after a net
aggressive buy by High Frequency Traders, prices remain 15% of a tick higher. When
High Frequency Traders buy passively, prices rise by 2% of a tick in the next second,
prices then slowly trend downward to about negative 3% of a tick at the 20th second.
The results are nearly the same for High Frequency Traders’ sell trades, with the notable
31For an “event-second” in which High Frequency Traders are net buyers, net aggressive buyers, and
net passive buyers, value-weighted average prices paid by the High Frequency Traders in that second
are subtracted from the value-weighted average prices for all trades in the same second and each of the
following 20 seconds. The results are averaged across event-seconds, weighted by the magnitude of the
High Frequency Traders’ net position change in the event-second. Price differences on the vertical axis
are given in the number of ticks ($12.50 per one E-mini contract).
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exception that while prices do decrease in the first second for passive High Frequency
Traders’ sell trades, they never cross into negative territory and, in fact, drift upward
to about 12% of a tick 19 seconds later. The results are qualitatively similar on May 6,
though prices appear to have a larger and more persistent response after sales by High
Frequency Traders. It is important to note that prices increase in the second after High
Frequency Traders complete their position change and not during the second that High
Frequency Traders change their position, consistent with timing ability and not just the
mechanical result of the price impact of marketable orders. This finding also cannot be
explained by persistence in High Frequency Traders’ inventory changes as one-second
High Frequency Traders inventory changes are not autocorrelated, as can be seen in
Table III.
In the second set of tests, we directly study the theory of quote sniping by ana-
lyzing how High Frequency Traders trade before and after decreases in the best bid or
increases in the best offer. In a centralized limit order book market, a pattern consis-
tent with stale quote sniping involves traders lifting posted depth just prior to a price
change and then offsetting their position immediately at the new price level. Despite
not directly examining limit order book data, the exact sequence of transactions and an
aggressive/passive flag allows us to infer trader activity around price change events in
the centralized E-mini order book in trade and volume time. We define a price increase
(decrease) event as the best ask (bid) price increasing (decreasing). This definition en-
sures that we do not consider bid-ask bounces as price change events. When the best ask
(bid) price increases (decreases), we count backwards the number of contracts traded at
the “old” best ask price preceding the price change event. When we get to 100 contracts,
we stop and attribute each side of the 100 contracts traded to one of the six categories
of traders, add up the contract sides for each category, and calculate for each category
the percentage share of trading volume for the last 100 contracts traded at the “old”
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best ask (bid) price before the price increase (decrease). We then compute averages for
each category’s overall price increase and decrease events over May 3 to 5 and May 6.
Similarly, we calculate the percentage shares of aggressive and passive volume for the
100 contracts at the ”new” best price after the price change. Our choice of examining
the last and first 100 contracts traded around a price change event is motivated by the
fact that the average posted depth at the best bid and offer during our sample was
roughly 500 contracts. Furthermore, over May 3 to 5, 98.67 contracts were traded per
second on average.32 Results are presented in Table V.
<Insert Table V>
Table V has four panels. Panel A presents price increase events over May 3 to 5.
Panel B presents price decrease events over May 3 to 5. Panels C and D present price
increase and decrease events on May 6, respectively. In each panel, the last column
presents the volume participation of different categories of traders without conditioning
on price changes.
As shown in the last column of Panel A, when not conditioning on price changes,
High Frequency Traders account for 34.04% of aggressive trading at the best ask price
level. The share of High Frequency Traders’ aggressive volume rises to 57.70% at the
best ask price level before price increase events and falls to 14.84% at the new best ask
price level after price increase events.33 On the passive side, High Frequency Traders
account for 34.33% of total passive volume at the best ask price level. However, the
share of High Frequency Traders’ passive volume at the best ask falls to 28.72% before
32Results are qualitatively similar for 20 and 50 contracts, as well as for 10, 25, and 50 transac-
tions. See the Internet Appendix. p-values associated with the averages and differences between High
Frequency Traders and Market Makers are always less than 1%.
33These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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a price increase event and rises to 37.93% at the new best ask price level after a price
increase event.34
For price decrease events, as shown in Panel B, the results are essentially symmetric.
High Frequency Traders account for 55.20% of aggressive sell volume for the last 100
contracts traded before a price decrease event, compared with 34.17% when not con-
ditioning on price changes. The share of High Frequency Traders’ aggressive volume
decreases to 15.04% at the new bid price after a price decrease event. On the passive
side, High Frequency Traders account for 34.45% of the total passive volume at the best
bid price level. The share of High Frequency Traders’ passive volume falls to 27.41%
before a price increase event and rises to 38.31% traded at the new best bid price level
after a price decrease event. Panels C and D show that the behavior of High Frequency
Traders is qualitatively similar on May 6.35
In contrast, Market Makers follow a noticeably more passive trading strategy than
High Frequency Traders. According to Panel A, Market Makers account for 13.48% of
passive volume at the ask and only 7.27% of the aggressive volume at the ask. For the
last 100 contracts at the old ask, Market Makers’ share of volume increases relatively
modestly, from 7.27% to 8.78% of aggressive volume at the old best ask price level.
However, Market Makers’ share of passive volume at the old best ask price also increases,
from 13.48% to 15.80%.
These results suggest that High Frequency Traders behave differently than traditional
market makers. The behavior of High Frequency Traders is empirically more consistent
34The respective pre-price change event and post-price change event for the High Frequency Traders’
aggressive and passive participation rates over May 3 to 5 are statistically distinguishable at the 1%
level.
35There were increases in the participation rate by Opportunistic Traders on the aggressive side of
trades on May 6. For example, Opportunistic Traders’ share of the aggressive volume at the ask price
before a price increase increases from 19.21% over May 3 to 5 to 34.26% on May 6. Similarly, their
share of aggressive volume at the bid price before a price decrease increases from 20.99% over May 3
to 5 to 33.86% on May 6.
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with the theories of quote sniping or latency arbitrage than theories of traditional market
making (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).36 Our results, which are based on all trading
in the E-mini, strengthen partial-sample results based on equity trading on NASDAQ
(see, for example, Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014)). We also directly link
our empirical design and results to the theory of quote sniping.
III. Conclusion
In this paper, we study intraday intermediation in the fully automated E-mini S&P
500 futures market before and during the Flash Crash, which was a period of large
and temporary selling pressure. Our results suggest that the behavior of nondesignated
intraday intermediaries is consistent with the theory of limited risk-bearing capacity:
they did not take on large risky inventories relative to the large and temporary selling
pressure on May 6. However, unlike textbook market makers, the most active intraday
intermediaries (classified as High Frequency Traders) did not significantly alter their
inventory dynamics when faced with large liquidity imbalances.
For a period of time, the Flash Crash seemed like an isolated event. However, flash
events in the U.S. Treasury markets on October 15, 2014 reignited discussion about the
vulnerability of liquid automated markets to severe dislocations and disruptive trading.
Our empirical approach provides a framework to study intraday market dynamics before
and during such systemic events, which may be a feature of the “new normal.”
36Without a sample of message-level data, we cannot determine whether High Frequency Traders
become more aggressive in response to other traders changing their orders or private information, though
the resulting trade patterns of either are consistent with quote sniping. Empirical patterns consistent
with quote sniping that we document at a higher frequency do not preclude negative correlations of
inventories and price changes at lower frequencies, as High Frequency Traders may employ heterogeneous
strategies.
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Table I
Market Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the June 2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures
contract. The first column presents averages calculated for May 3 through 5, 2010,
between 8:30 and 15:15 CT. The second column presents statistics for May 6, 2010
between 8:30 and 15:15 CT. Volume is the number of contracts traded. The num-
ber of traders is the number of trading accounts that traded at least once during
a trading day. Order size and trade size are measured in number of contracts.
The use of limit orders is presented in both percent of the number of transactions
and trading volume. Volatility is calculated as the natural logarithm of maximum
price over minimum price within a trading day.
May 3–5 May 6
Daily Trading Volume 2,397,639 5,094,703
# of Trades 446,340 1,030,204
# of Traders 11,875 15,422
Trade Size 5.41 4.99
Limit Orders % Volume 95.45% 92.44%
Limit Orders % Trades 94.36% 91.75%
Volatility (Log High-Low Price Range) 1.54% 9.82%
Return -0.02% -3.05%
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Table III
Baseline Regression: Net Holdings and Prices
This table presents estimated coefficients for the regression: ∆yt = α+ φ∆yt−1 + δyt−1 +∑20
i=0[βi × ∆pt−i/0.25] + t. The dependent variable is the change in holdings of High
Frequency Traders or Market Makers, as indicated. Both changes in holdings, ∆yt, and
lagged holdings, yt−1, are in contracts. Price changes, ∆pt−i, are in ticks. The sampling
frequency is one second. t-statistics, calculated using the White (1980) estimator are
reported in parentheses. Observations are stacked for May 3 through 5.
∆ NP HFT ∆ NP MM
Intercept -1.64 -0.53
(-3.54) (-3.33)
∆NPHFTt−1 -0.01
(-0.69)
NPHFTt−1 -0.01
(-11.77)
∆NPMMt−1
(-0.79)
NPMMt−1 -0.004
(-8.93)
∆Pt 32.09 -13.54
(18.44) (-23.83)
∆Pt−1 17.18 -1.22
(12.58) (-2.71)
∆Pt−2 8.36 2.16
(7.15) (4.99)
∆Pt−3 5.09 2.53
(4.93) (5.97)
∆Pt−4 3.91 2.65
(3.62) (6.54)
∆Pt−5 1.81 2.50
(1.56) (5.91)
∆Pt−6 -0.08 2.16
(-0.07) (5.42)
∆Pt−7 -1.00 1.84
(-0.97) (4.96)
∆Pt−8 -1.76 1.47
(-1.56) (3.83)
∆Pt−9 -1.81 0.45
(-1.70) (1.19)
∆Pt−10 -3.90 0.52
(-3.78) (1.37)
∆Pt−11 -4.73 -0.03
(-4.70) (-0.07)
∆Pt−12 -3.46 0.15
(-3.33) (0.41)
∆Pt−13 -3.80 0.27
(-3.74) (0.72)
∆Pt−14 -4.77 0.32
(-4.70) (0.86)
∆Pt−15 -2.74 -0.19
(-2.63) (-0.53)
∆Pt−16 -2.21 -0.64
(-2.09) (-1.72)
∆Pt−17 -2.52 -0.10
(-2.45) (-0.26)
∆Pt−18 -4.36 0.04
(-3.96) (0.12)
∆Pt−19 -4.21 0.57
(-4.16) (1.51)
∆Pt−20 -5.86 -0.12
(-5.86) (-0.33)
#obs 72837 72837
Adj − R2 0.019 0.026
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Table IV
High Frequency Traders and Market Makers: The Flash Crash
This table presents estimated coefficients for the regression: ∆yt = α+φ∆yt−1 + ∆yt−1 +
Σ20i=0[βi × pt−i/0.25] +DDt {αD + φD∆yt−1 + δDyt−1 + Σ20i=0[βDi × pt−i/0.25]}+DUt {αU +
φU∆yt−1 + δUyt−1 + Σ20i=0[β
U
i × pt−i/0.25]}+ t over May 3 through 6, 2010 with dummy
variables DDt and D
U
t included to interact with observations during the “Down” (from
13:32:00 CT to 13:45:28 CT) and “Up” (from 13:45:33 CT to 14:08:00 CT) phases of the
Flash Crash. The period between 13:45:28 CT and 13:45:33 CT corresponds to the five-
second pause in trading; there are no changes in prices or inventory during the five-second
pause. The cutoff for observations on May 6, 2010 is 14:08:00 CT. The dependent variable
the change in holdings of High Frequency Traders or Market Makers, as indicated. Both
changes in holdings, ∆yt, and lagged holdings, yt−1, are in contracts. Price changes, ∆pt−i,
are in ticks. Estimates are computed for second-by-second observations. t-statistics,
calculated using the White (1980) estimator are reported in parentheses.
Variable ∆ NP HFT ∆ NP MM Variable (cont) ∆ NP HFT ∆ NP MM Variable (cont) ∆ NP HFT ∆ NP MM
Intercept -2.04 -0.48 InterceptD 9.22 9.15 InterceptU 2.27 0.49
(-4.78) (-3.34) (1.19) (2.41) (0.55) (0.33)
∆NPt−1 -0.005 -0.024 ∆NPDt−1 -0.031 -0.024 ∆NP
U
t−1 0.004 0.085
(-0.69) (-3.31) (-0.80) (-0.63) (0.10) (2.74)
NPt−1 -0.005 -0.005 NPDt−1 -0.002 -0.007 NP
U
t−1 -0.001 0.000
(-12.95) (-10.78) (-0.38) (-1.62) (-0.21) (-0.17)
∆Pt 31.47 -15.48 ∆P
D
t 1.29 14.13 ∆P
U
t -40.83 14.29
(16.89) (-21.96) (0.18) (6.73) (-12.18) (13.68)
∆Pt−1 14.96 -0.54 ∆PDt−1 -3.02 11.44 ∆P
U
t−1 -9.60 5.63
(12.17) (-1.23) (-0.57) (5.11) (-3.44) (7.12)
∆Pt−2 6.24 2.69 ∆PDt−2 -6.84 1.87 ∆P
U
t−2 -9.72 -1.83
(5.36) (5.99) (-1.26) (0.81) (-3.57) (-2.20)
∆Pt−3 3.02 2.65 ∆PDt−3 -4.16 -2.03 ∆P
U
t−3 -3.97 -2.47
(3.31) (7.14) (-0.69) (-1.22) (-1.61) (-3.75)
∆Pt−4 1.92 2.74 ∆PDt−4 -9.74 -4.91 ∆P
U
t−4 -1.12 -2.51
(2.04) (7.78) (-1.98) (-3.11) (-0.49) (-3.70)
∆Pt−5 0.63 2.21 ∆PDt−5 -10.94 -3.45 ∆P
U
t−5 1.86 -2.86
(0.64) (5.99) (-1.57) (-2.25) (0.75) (-4.36)
∆Pt−6 -1.89 1.99 ∆PDt−6 0.59 -2.91 ∆P
U
t−6 4.27 -2.45
(-2.03) (5.72) (0.11) (-1.86) (1.78) (-3.71)
∆Pt−7 -2.85 1.92 ∆PDt−7 -1.66 -2.71 ∆P
U
t−7 -4.54 -3.38
(-2.89) (5.18) (-0.31) (-1.59) (-1.73) (-5.05)
∆Pt−8 -2.52 1.43 ∆PDt−8 2.45 -2.97 ∆P
U
t−8 1.79 -1.65
(-2.68) (4.33) (0.44) (-1.92) (0.76) (-2.76)
∆Pt−9 -2.59 0.48 ∆PDt−9 -4.32 -2.98 ∆P
U
t−9 2.69 -1.64
(-2.76) (1.44) (-0.61) (-1.70) (1.12) (-2.54)
∆Pt−10 -5.18 0.91 ∆PDt−10 3.93 -3.40 ∆P
U
t−10 4.41 -1.52
(-4.66) (2.12) (0.50) (-1.78) (1.76) (-2.22)
∆Pt−11 -5.07 -0.05 ∆PDt−11 9.84 -6.35 ∆P
U
t−11 6.01 -0.36
(-5.76) (-0.16) (1.30) (-2.96) (2.27) (-0.51)
∆Pt−12 -4.05 -0.10 ∆PDt−12 8.38 -0.73 ∆P
U
t−12 4.37 -0.79
(-4.46) (-0.31) (1.07) (-0.37) (1.34) (-1.26)
∆Pt−13 -3.86 -0.07 ∆PDt−13 11.92 -4.69 ∆P
U
t−13 10.02 0.28
(-4.27) (-0.20) (1.64) (-2.10) (3.34) (0.43)
∆Pt−14 -4.36 0.28 ∆PDt−14 -8.56 0.79 ∆P
U
t−14 1.64 -0.59
(-5.01) (0.84) (-1.29) (0.41) (0.62) (-0.98)
∆Pt−15 -2.05 -0.17 ∆PDt−15 8.46 -5.41 ∆P
U
t−15 1.47 -0.09
(-2.27) (-0.50) (1.17) (-2.55) (0.64) (-0.15)
∆Pt−16 -2.01 -0.39 ∆PDt−16 -3.25 3.92 ∆P
U
t−16 1.07 0.99
(-2.10) (-1.11) (-0.41) (1.80) (0.37) (1.56)
∆Pt−17 -2.67 0.01 ∆PDt−17 6.24 -1.57 ∆P
U
t−17 5.19 0.48
(-3.05) (0.02) (0.81) (-0.69) (2.13) (0.75)
∆Pt−18 -3.89 0.19 ∆PDt−18 -8.62 0.86 ∆P
U
t−18 7.37 -0.69
(-4.10) (0.58) (-1.05) (0.42) (2.58) (-1.12)
∆Pt−19 -3.50 0.70 ∆PDt−19 -1.05 -3.07 ∆P
U
t−19 -0.75 -0.88
(-3.88) (2.08) (-0.12) (-1.39) (-0.30) (-1.44)
∆Pt−20 -5.30 -0.33 ∆PDt−20 -2.32 3.13 ∆P
U
t−20 4.88 -0.06
(-5.82) (-1.00) (-0.30) (1.36) (2.14) (-0.09)
# of Obs 93092 93092
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.036
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Table V
Shares of Passive and Aggressive Trading Volume Around Price Increase
and Price Decrease Events
This table presents each trader category’s share of aggressive and passive trading volume
for the last 100 contracts traded before a price increase event or price decrease event
and the first 100 contracts traded at the new higher (lower) price after a price increase
(decrease) event. For comparison purposes, this table also presents the unconditional
share of aggressive and passive trading volume of each trader category. Trading categories
are High Frequency Traders (Hft), Market Makers (Mm), Fundamental Buyers (Buyer),
Fundamental Sellers (Seller), Opportunistic Traders (Opp), and Small Traders (Small).
To emphasize the symmetry between buying and selling, the rows for Buyer and Seller in
Panels B and D have been reversed relative to Panels A and C.
Panel A: Trading at the Best Ask Around Price Increase Events, May 3–5, 2010
Last 100 Contracts First 100 Contracts Volume at Best Ask
Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive
Hft 28.72% 57.70% 37.93% 14.84% 34.33% 34.04%
Mm 15.80% 8.78% 19.58% 7.04% 13.48% 7.27%
Buyer 6.70% 11.61% 4.38% 26.17% 4.57% 21.53%
Seller 16.00% 2.65% 11.82% 7.09% 16.29% 5.50%
Opp 32.27% 19.21% 25.95% 43.39% 30.90% 31.08%
Small 0.51% 0.04% 0.34% 1.46% 0.44% 0.58%
Panel B: Trading at the Best Bid Around Price Decrease Events, May 3–5, 2010
Last 100 Contracts First 100 Contracts All Volume at Best Bid
Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive
Hft 27.41% 55.20% 38.31% 15.04% 34.45% 34.17%
Mm 15.49% 8.57% 20.64% 6.58% 13.79% 7.45%
Seller 5.88% 11.96% 3.83% 24.87% 5.67% 20.91%
Buyer 17.98% 3.22% 12.71% 8.78% 15.40% 6.00%
Opp 32.77% 20.99% 24.18% 43.41% 30.30% 30.89%
Small 0.47% 0.06% 0.34% 1.32% 0.39% 0.58%
Panel C: Trading at the Best Ask Around Price Increase Events, May 6, 2010
Last 100 Contracts First 100 Contracts All Volume at Best Ask
Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive
Hft 28.46% 38.86% 30.55% 14.84% 30.94% 26.98%
Mm 12.95% 5.50% 13.88% 5.45% 12.26% 5.82%
Buyer 6.31% 17.49% 5.19% 21.76% 5.45% 20.12%
Seller 13.84% 3.84% 14.30% 5.71% 14.34% 4.40%
OPP 38.26% 34.26% 35.94% 51.87% 36.86% 42.37%
Small 0.19% 0.06% 0.16% 0.37% 0.16% 0.31%
Panel D: Trading at the Best Bid Around Price Decrease Events, May 6, 2010
Last 100 Contracts First 100 Contracts All Volume at Best Bid
Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive Passive Aggressive
Hft 28.38% 38.67% 30.13% 14.59% 30.09% 26.29%
Mm 12.27% 5.04% 14.85% 5.64% 12.05% 5.88%
Seller 4.19% 16.46% 3.77% 21.21% 3.82% 17.55%
Buyer 15.83% 5.90% 13.89% 6.97% 15.27% 7.26%
Opp 39.12% 33.86% 37.15% 51.10% 38.56% 42.68%
Small 0.21% 0.08% 0.21% 0.48% 0.21% 0.34%
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Figure 1: Prices and trading volume of the E-mini S&P 500 stock index
futures contract. Source: “Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of
May 6, 2010.” This figure presents minute-by-minute transaction prices and trading
volume of the June 2010 E-mini S&P futures contract on May 6, 2010 between 8:30 and
15:15 CT. Trading volume is calculated as the number of contracts traded during each
minute. Transaction price is the last transaction price of each minute.
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Figure 2: Trading accounts, trading volume, and net position scaled by mar-
ket trading volume. This figure presents trader categories superimposed (as shaded
areas) over all individual trading accounts ranked by their trading volume and net
position scaled by market trading volume. The panels reflect trading activity in the
June 2010 E-mini S&P 500 futures contract for May 3 through 6, 2010.
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Figure 3: Net position of Market Makers and High Frequency Traders. This
figure presents the net position (left vertical axis) of Market Makers and High Frequency
Traders and market transaction prices (right vertical axis) in the June 2010 E-mini S&P
500 futures contract over one-minute intervals during May 3, 4, 5, and 6 between 8:30
and 15:15 CT. Net position is calculated as the difference between the total open long
and total open short positions of Market Makers and High Frequency Traders at the end
of each minute. Transaction price is the last market transaction price each minute. The
top panel presents the net positions of Market Makers and the bottom panel presents
the net positions of High Frequency Traders.
Figure 4: High Frequency Traders’ trading and prices. This figure illustrates
how prices change after HFT trading activity in a given second. The upper-left panel
presents results for buy trades for May 3 through 5, 2010, the upper-right panel presents
results for buy trades on May 6, 2010 and the lower-left and lower-right panels present
corresponding results for sell trades. For an “event-second” in which High Frequency
Traders are net buyers, net Aggressive Buyers, and net Passive Buyers, value-weighted
average prices paid by the High Frequency Traders in that second are subtracted from
the value-weighted average prices for all trades in the same second and each of the
following 20 seconds. The results are averaged across event-seconds, weighted by the
magnitude of High Frequency Traders’ net position change in the event-second. The
upper-left panel presents results for May 3 through 5, the upper-right panel presents
results for May 6, and the lower two panels present results for sell trades calculated
analogously. Price differences on the vertical axis are scaled so that one unit equals one
tick ($12.50 per contract).
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